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OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND THE 
LIMITS OF PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY  
RYAN NUNN* & GABRIEL SCHEFFLER** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Public choice theory has long been the dominant lens through 
which economists and other scholars have viewed occupational li-
censing. According to the public choice account, practitioners favor 
licensing because they want to reduce competition and drive up their 
own wages. This essay argues that the public choice account has 
been overstated, and that it ironically has served to distract from 
some of the most important harms of licensing, as well as from po-
tential solutions. We emphasize three specific drawbacks of this ac-
count. First, it is more dismissive of legitimate threats to public 
health and safety than the research warrants. Second, it places dis-
proportionate emphasis on those professions for which the justifica-
tion for licensing seems weakest, rather than on those for which the 
justification is stronger. Third, it puts an inordinate focus on whether 
an occupation is licensed, rather than how it is licensed. Judges and 
policymakers should bear these limitations in mind when evaluating 
legal challenges or proposed reforms to licensing laws.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Public choice theory has long been the dominant lens through which 
economists and other scholars have viewed occupational licensing.1  Ac-
cording to the public choice account, political officials are primarily moti-
vated by their own material self-interest, and practitioners seek licensing in 
order to reduce competition and drive up their own wages at the expense of 
the general public.2  In other words, public choice theory implies that the 
goal of licensing is not to improve quality or to protect public safety, but ra-
ther to reduce competition.3 
The predominance of the public choice account of occupational licens-
ing is attributable to its explanatory power: it helps to explain several fea-
tures of the licensure system in the United States that are difficult to under-
stand from any other perspective.  For example, occupational licensing 
requirements vary tremendously from state to state, and often do not bear 
 
1. See, e.g., Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Profession-
als and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 724 (2005) (“The 
dominant view today is that the regulatory licensing process has been captured by industry 
to erect entry restrictions for its own benefit.”); Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition 
and Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J.L. & ECON. 165, 165 (1978) (“It is widely believed 
among economists that barriers to entry into medical practice have been erected for the 
economic advantage of those practicing medicine.”). 
2. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 209, 234 (2016) (noting that in “today’s policymaking arena . . . individuals are 
primarily motivated by self-interest, rather than the public interest.”). 
3. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 11 
(1976) (“That restricting access is the real purpose, and not merely a side effect, of many if 
not most successful campaigns to institute licensing schemes can scarcely be doubted.”). 
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any apparent relation to public health and safety concerns or to the specific 
demands of the profession.4  These discrepancies are difficult to account for 
if the primary purpose of licensing is to protect the public or to correct a 
market failure.5  
Public choice theory also helps to explain why licensing laws have prolif-
erated in recent decades.  Roughly one in four workers in the United States 
holds an occupational license today, up from an estimated five percent in 
the early 1950s.6  Because the benefits of licensure primarily accrue to li-
censed professionals while its costs are dispersed broadly across the popula-
tion, new licensing laws are much easier to pass than to repeal.7  In addi-
tion, states have an incentive to favor increasing the number of licensed 
professions because licensing boards are usually funded through fees and 
are often revenue-generating.8  For these reasons, unlike some other appli-
cations of public choice theory, the public choice account of occupational 
licensing has largely been accepted.9 
In recent years, litigants and scholars have increasingly invoked the pub-
lic choice narrative in favor of more stringent judicial review of occupation-
al licensing and regulation more generally.10  Traditionally, courts upheld 
 
4. See DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF 
BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING INST. FOR JUSTICE 6, 24–25 (2d ed. 2017); Lar-
kin, supra note 2, at 219–20 (“There also appears to be no rational relationship between the 
stringency of the licensing requirements and the demands placed on practitioners.”). 
5. See DANA BERLINER ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING RUN WILD 11 (2017) (“[I]f 
the public benefits from occupational licensing were obvious (and/or genuine) for any given 
vocation, we would expect to observe broad consensus in legal and regulatory requirements 
across the states, both in terms of what occupations are regulated and what credentials are 
required for licensure.”). 
6. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., 2017 DATA ON CERTIFICATIONS AND LICENSES, LABOR 
FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2018); see also Morris M. 
Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. IND. 
REL. 676, 677, 678 (2010); Morris Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influ-
ence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173, S175–76 (2013) (ex-
plaining the rise in occupational licensing from the 1950s to the late 2000s). 
7. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 
BELL J. ECON. MAN. SCI. 3 (1971).  
8. See Robert J. Thornton & Edward J. Timmons, The De-Licensing of Occupations in the 
United States, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2015, at 10. 
9. See John Blevins, License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix Occupational Licensing, 64 
UCLA L. REV. 844, 868–69 (2017) (“While regulatory critics often invoke public choice too 
casually to oppose any regulation, the theory works well for occupational licensing.”). 
10. See, e.g., Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
21, Niang v. Tomblinson, 2018 WL 1785178 (2018) (No. 17-1428) (“The real motivation of 
the industry insiders who chiefly populate the [licensing] board here is neither public health 
nor consumer protection, but rather a self-serving de-sire to limit market entry by potential 
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licensing schemes as constitutional as long as there was a plausible public 
safety rationale;11 however, several courts have recently invalidated occupa-
tional licensing arrangements on constitutional grounds.12  In doing so, 
some courts have echoed the standard public choice account of licensing, 
striking down licensing laws that—in their view—solely serve to shield 
practitioners from competition and to enhance their market power.13  
The influence of public choice theory can be seen in a recent challenge 
to a Missouri cosmetology and barber licensing law.  The Petitioners chal-
lenged the constitutionality of this law, arguing that “greater understanding 
of licensing burdens and regulatory capture require . . . [the Supreme] 
Court to revisit its occupational licensing decisions.”14  In doing so, the Peti-
tioners further argued that the Court should overturn long-held legal prec-
 
competitors while collecting tens of thousands of dollars on training programs run by those 
same insiders.”); Larkin, supra note 2, at 330–31 (“Numerous state regulatory schemes func-
tion simply as a means of limiting entry by potential rivals to protect incumbents against 
competition and allow them to raise the price of their services.  Indeed, occupational licens-
ing schemes often serve no other purpose . . .  It is time for the Supreme Court to 
acknowledge what is actually going on with occupational licensing and to intervene to pro-
tect the public from the worst excesses of that practice.”); see also Joseph Sanderson, Don’t 
Bury the Competition: Occupational Licensing and a Toolbox for Reform, 31 YALE J. REG. 455, 465 
(2014) (“Most recent occupational licensing litigation has come in the form of constitutional 
challenges to one scheme or another, often brought by libertarian public interest law firms 
seeking to reintroduce intensive scrutiny of economic regulations.”). 
11. See Sandra Johnson, Structure of Governmental Oversight of Quality in Healthcare, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 492, 494 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2017) (ex-
plaining that the state’s use of its police power to regulate occupations must “further health, 
safety, and the general welfare,” and that challenges to licensing schemes as illegitimate uses 
of the police power are typically unsuccessful); see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla-
homa, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. 
California Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1051–53 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding occupa-
tional licensing schemes as constitutional). 
12. See Nick Robinson, The Multiple Justifications of Occupational Licensing, 93 WASH. L. 
REV. 1903, 1906 (2018) (“[O]ver the past several decades the federal courts have created a 
de facto occupational licensing jurisprudence through their interpretation of the first and 
fourteenth amendments of the Constitution as well as antitrust law . . . Federal courts 
have . . . used the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th amendment to strike 
down occupational licensing requirements for occupations like African hair braiders, casket 
sellers, and some pest control professionals.”); see, e.g., Saint Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F. 
3d 215, 223, 226 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding no rational relationship between public health and 
safety and the restriction at issue).  
13. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Courts have re-
peatedly recognized that protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is 
not a legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
14. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 34, Niang v. Tomblinson, 2018 WL 1785178 
(2018) (No. 17-1428); see also Brief for Public Choice Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 5–6, Niang v. Tomblinson, 2018 WL 1785178 (2018) (No. 17-1428). 
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edent and hold that the Privileges or Immunities Clause guarantees the 
“right to pursue an economic livelihood.”15  Others have discussed the dan-
gers of reviving Lochner-style judicial review of regulation, which is outside 
the scope this Essay.16  Suffice it to say, such a decision would have vast im-
plications not only for occupational licensing, but also for regulation more 
generally.17 
This Essay argues that the public choice account of occupational licens-
ing has been overstated, which has served to distract from some of the most 
important harms of licensing, as well as from potential solutions.  Part I de-
scribes alternative theoretical accounts that play a role in explaining occu-
pational licensing, including consumer protection, professionalization, and 
occupational “arms races.” 
Part II then emphasizes three particular drawbacks of the standard pub-
lic choice account.  First, the standard public choice account of licensing is 
more dismissive of legitimate threats to public health and safety than the 
research warrants.  This is counterproductive because it provides judges 
and policymakers with an oversimplified framework for applying legal doc-
trine and implementing regulatory policy that dismisses legitimate public 
safety risks.  
The second drawback—closely related to the first—is that overreliance 
on the public choice account of licensing tends to place a disproportionate 
emphasis on those professions for which the public interest account is least 
plausible (e.g., barbers), rather than on traditionally licensed professions 
(e.g., doctors), for which the justification for licensing is stronger.  However, 
this view may overlook some of the most harmful consequences of licensing.  
By contrast, we argue that licensure reform is especially necessary for pro-
fessions in fields such as health care and law, even though members of those 
professions may pose credible risks to health and safety. 
A third related problem is that the public choice account often puts an 
inordinate focus on whether an occupation is licensed, rather than how it is 
licensed.  This can blind policymakers and advocates to the ways that li-
censing can be reformed without simply eliminating licensure for a particu-
lar profession.  
 
15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 38-41 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court should overturn the Slaughter-House Cases).  The Court ultimately did not do so, instead 
invalidating the law as moot.  See Niang v. Carroll, 879 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2017), vacated as 
moot, Niang v. Tomblinson, 139 S. Ct. 319 (2018). 
16. See, e.g., Blevins, supra note 9, at 877 (arguing that reviving Lochner would turn courts 
into “super-legislatures free from democratic control”). 
17. Id. (“[A] revived Lochner doctrine could easily expand beyond the occupational li-
censing context.  The logic of these doctrines extends to other regulatory realms that impact 
one’s economic freedom, such as labor, health, and environmental restrictions.  Occupa-
tional licensing could thus validate the doctrine and make it respectable to use in other con-
texts.  And once unleashed, the doctrines could not be checked by legislative actions.”). 
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We conclude by cautioning that judges and policymakers should bear 
the limitations of the public choice account in mind when evaluating 
how—and whether—to change licensing laws, and that they should avoid 
relying solely on the standard public choice narrative.  Understanding these 
limitations is particularly important at this moment, given that legal advo-
cates are attempting to bootstrap the public choice account into overturn-
ing existing legal precedent and reviving more searching judicial scrutiny of 
regulation.18   
I.  THEORIES OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
It is simplest to see the limitations of the public choice account by exam-
ining situations in which other explanations are more compelling.  To be 
sure, public choice mechanisms can complement these explanations, but a 
narrow focus on the classic Olsonian dynamic is missing other important 
parts of the story.19 
A. Consumer Protection 
The traditional legal justification for licensure is that it is necessary to 
protect the public from incompetent or deceptive practitioners.20  Accord-
ing to this view, licensing ensures quality by mandating that practitioners 
meet certain minimum training and educational requirements.  This is es-
pecially important in certain fields where consumers have incomplete in-
formation about practitioners’ competence or where practitioners can in-
flict serious harm on consumers.21  Depending on the nature of this 
informational problem, licensing or other regulatory interventions may be 
necessary to improve market outcomes and protect public health and safe-
ty.22  
 
18. Id. at 871. 
19. See David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE 
L.J. 78, 119 (2017) (“The politics of occupational licensing follow a classic Olsonian script.”). 
20. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (“The power of the State to 
provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as 
in its judgment will secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and 
incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud.”). 
21. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 967 (1963) (stating that the appropriate regulatory design “in any given 
case depends on the degree of difficulty consumers have in making the choice unaided, and 
on the consequences of errors of judgment”). 
22. See, e.g., Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality 
Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1339, 1342–43 (1979) (arguing that a government may 
have an interest in imposing quality standards higher than those that would prevail in the 
free market). 
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B. Professionalization 
As public choice theorists suggest, the path to licensure generally re-
quires that members of an occupation first become organized in order to 
effectively lobby a state legislature.23  However, occupations do not organ-
ize solely for the purpose of becoming licensed.  
Rather, professionalization—which typically goes hand-in-hand with oc-
cupational self-organization—generates other benefits for workers and con-
sumers.  The professionalization process takes on a variety of forms, includ-
ing the establishment of uniform curricula, standards, and certifications.24  
Particularly when occupations deal with technologically complex problems, 
information about service quality is often difficult for consumers to access.25  
By improving education and training and establishing strong signals of 
quality that give consumers more confidence in the profession, members of 
an occupation can benefit both themselves and the general public.26  
Professionalization requires institutions that can conduct the organiza-
tional work required to establish uniform standards and processes.  Profes-
sional schools, accreditation or certifying bodies, and associations are all 
part of this institutional apparatus.27  Once these institutions have been 
built, it is a much shorter step to licensure than it would otherwise have 
been.  At this point, members of the occupation now have a professional 
body that represents them and a detailed, implementable plan for licensure 
(including required curricula).  
Licensing is often viewed as the last step to raise the status of the licensed 
profession, though the desire to exclude competitors and raise wages in the 
profession—to the detriment of consumers and other workers—is likely an 
important part of the motivation as well.28  The key point, however, is that 
the other steps in the professionalization process, like establishing uniform 
educational and training standards, do not necessarily limit competition.29 
 
23. See Charles J. Wheelan, Politics or Public Interest?  Licensing and the Case of Respiratory 
Therapists, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, Winter 2005, at 42–43. 
24. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF ECON. POL’Y, THE COUNCIL OF ECON. 
ADVISERS & THE DEP’T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 11 (2015) [hereinafter WH REPORT]. 
25. Id. 
26. Id.  
27. See Paul Starr, Professionalization and Public Health: Historical Legacies, Continuing Dilem-
mas, 15 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. S26, S27 (2009). 
28. See BENJAMIN SHIMBERG ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND 
POLICIES 13 (1972) (“[L]icensing is often promoted as a way to enhance the status and the 
public image of the group.  Not so loudly heralded but certainly as important an incentive is 
the economic benefit that often accompanies licensure.”). 
29. See Starr, supra note 27, at S27 (“To be sure, the professional autonomy and status 
of physicians have their clear benefits and not just from the standpoint of physicians.  The 
perquisites of medicine have served a public interest by attracting highly qualified students 
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C. Occupational Arms Races 
Occupations do not always come with tasks that are clearly distinct from 
those of other occupations.  In many instances, there is substantial overlap, 
such as between physical therapists and athletic trainers, or between ad-
vanced practice registered nurses and physicians, or between dental hygien-
ists and dentists.  In a world without occupational licensing, this overlap 
would not pose any regulatory issues.  
But when at least one occupation is licensed—with an exclusive statutory 
right to conduct a set of tasks—occupations with overlapping functions will 
also have an interest in becoming licensed.30  Members of these occupations 
that seek licensure are not necessarily attempting to benefit at the expense 
of consumers, but may simply be defending their ability to work against the 
earlier-licensed incumbents by organizing and obtaining a fully authorized 
scope of practice.31  Conversely, the earlier-licensed incumbent profession-
als may be attempting to maximize their earnings and employment at the 
expense of the less-privileged profession.32 
One might argue that this is consistent with a public choice account—if 
that is defined broadly to encompass any self-interested behavior of the pro-
fessions.  However, it is inconsistent with the paradigmatic case of a single 
organized interest group securing rents at the expense of a dispersed group 
of consumers.  Instead, organized interest groups are largely battling each 
other for access to jobs.33 
*** 
Importantly, the different explanations for licensing may be difficult to 
disentangle and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  For example, alt-
hough historians have written several treatises on the origins of medical li-
 
into the field and encouraging them to invest in and endure a lengthy and demanding edu-
cation . . . .  Beginning around the turn of the 20th century; however, physicians’ success in 
using licensure and other measures to get stronger protection against competition raised the 
costs of healthcare.”) 
30. See Morris M. Kleiner, Battling over Jobs: Occupational Licensing in Health Care, 106 AM. 
ECON. REV. 165, 168 (2016) (describing how physical therapists are sometimes advantaged 
relative to occupational therapists by the terms of their occupational licensure). 
31. The legal ability to carry out all the tasks for which a worker has been trained is 
quite important to his or her earnings and employment.  For example, even in the case of 
marginal restrictions to their scope of practice, nurse practitioners (NPs) suffer substantial 
earnings reductions, balanced by earnings increases for physicians.  See Morris M. Kleiner et 
al., Relaxing Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service, 59 
J.L. & ECON. 261, 274–75 (2016).  In addition, states with more restrictive scopes of practice 
have lower employment of NPs.  Id.  
32. See id. 
33. See Kleiner, Battling over Jobs, supra note 30, at 166, 168 (2016) (arguing that more 
market-based systems like certification could increase equity and efficiency in the labor mar-
ket). 
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censure, there still is no clear historical consensus as to whether “regular” 
allopathic physicians initially sought licensure primarily to enhance their 
own market power over competing medical schools, or whether they did so 
to improve quality by driving out low-quality practitioners.34  Some schol-
ars have embraced a combination of these theories.35 
In Daniel Carpenter and David Moss’s book on regulatory capture, they 
suggest that there may be a middle ground between the public choice ac-
count of regulation and the public interest view.36  Carpenter and Moss de-
fine “weak capture” as “when special interest influence compromises the 
capacity of regulation to enhance the public interest, but the public is still 
being served by regulation, relative to the baseline of no regulation.”37  An 
economist might characterize this state of affairs in terms of average and 
marginal net benefits: the average net benefit of occupational regulation 
can still be positive even when the marginal net benefit is negative.38  It is 
possible, then, that even when practitioners seek licensing out of a desire to 
enhance their own market power or skew licensing restrictions in anti-
competitive ways, there are at least some instances in which the public is 
still better off with some licensing than with none. 
II.  THE LIMITS OF THE PUBLIC CHOICE ACCOUNT 
A. Does Licensing Improve Quality and Protect Health and Safety? 
Proponents of the public choice account sometimes point to the paucity 
of empirical evidence finding that licensing improves quality or public safe-
ty as support for the public choice account of licensing.39  Yet a careful re-
view of the empirical research paints a more nuanced picture.  While it is 
 
34. See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, 
or the Market? 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 828 (1995) (“The nineteenth century origins of physician 
licensure have been thoroughly studied, and a variety of theories have emerged as to why 
licensure was in fact adopted.”) 
35. See, e.g., CHRISTY FORD CHAPIN, ENSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH—THE PUBLIC 
CREATION OF THE CORPORATE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 14–15 (2015). 
36. See generally DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS, Introduction to PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel 
Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014). 
37. Id at 12.  
38. See, e.g., HAL VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 382–84 (2010) (explaining how 
marginal costs can exceed average costs). 
39. See, e.g., Charles H. Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer’s Case for 
Abolition, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 341 (1983) (“Licensure, however, has not produced the de-
sired gains in the quality of health care, in large measure because the profession itself con-
trols the licensure mechanism.”); Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should 
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1116 (2014) (“The eco-
nomic research on quality of service as a function of licensing paints a murky picture.”). 
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true that a large majority of empirical studies find that licensing restrictions 
do not improve quality, these studies have of necessity focused on incre-
mental changes in licensing restrictions, rather than comparing licensed 
professionals to comparable unlicensed professionals.40  Furthermore, by 
necessity, these studies have tended to focus on evaluating licensing re-
quirements that vary across states, rather than those that have been adopt-
ed by all fifty states (e.g., the requirement that physicians attend medical 
school).  One might reasonably assume that the former requirements are 
less likely to have impacts on quality than the latter. 
The quality impacts of these policies are certainly relevant to decisions 
about licensure rules that policymakers are commonly faced with today.  
However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this literature—
which is less informative with regard to licensing requirements that have 
been universally adopted by all fifty states and therefore cannot be easily 
studied—as well as the impacts of licensing laws as a whole. 
The few studies that focus on the initial adoption of licensing laws find 
that licensing has in fact led to quality improvements.  For example, one 
study examines the adoption of licensing requirements in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries and finds evidence that licensing restrictions raised the 
quality of physicians and lowered mortality in specific areas where physi-
cian quality was most likely to have mattered at that time.41  Another recent 
study finds that licensing laws for midwives reduced maternal and infant 
mortality.42 
The discrepancy between the research focusing on contemporary licens-
ing restrictions and the research focusing on earlier requirements may be 
attributable to the fact that the most valuable licensing rules—in the protec-
tion of health and safety—were likely to be implemented first.  Professions 
for which there was a stronger health or safety justification, such as medi-
cine, were among the first to be licensed and are now universally licensed.  
Within professions, the most valuable rules were likely adopted early.  Sub-
sequent “ratcheting-up” of licensing requirements may have added less val-
ue.43  Studies that focus on the initial adoption of licensing laws may cap-
 
40. See WH REPORT, supra note 24, at 60 (“[M]ost of the empirical evidence on licens-
ing comes from looking at very specific examples.  While the aforementioned studies indi-
cate that occupational licensing does not guarantee quality improvements, they likewise do 
not indicate that all licensing frameworks fail to increase service quality.”). 
41. See Law & Kim, supra note 1, at 748. 
42. See Mark Anderson et al., The Effect of Occupational Licensing on Consumer Welfare: Early 
Midwifery Laws and Maternal Mortality (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
22456, 2016). 
43. See, e.g., Suyoun Han & Morris M. Kleiner, Analyzing the Influence of Occupational Li-
censing Duration and Grandfathering on Labor Market Outcomes 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 22810, 2017) (noting that adding these licensing requirements results in 
fewer practitioners working longer hours). 
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ture the effects of the most useful licensing rules, but those focused on more 
incremental changes in licensing restrictions would not.  
In sum, contrary to some deregulatory proponents, we do not believe 
there is sufficient evidence to conclude that abolishing licensing would have 
no impact on quality (or, still further, improve quality).44  Rather, the avail-
able evidence suggests a more limited conclusion: that many contemporary 
licensing restrictions do not improve quality, particularly some restrictions 
that vary across jurisdictions.45  However, the literature suggests that some 
licensing requirements likely lead to quality improvements.  Carefully dis-
tinguishing those requirements from unnecessary requirements is an im-
portant objective for public policy. 
B. The Harms of Licensing in Traditionally Licensed Fields  
From reading many of the popular accounts of licensing, one might be 
forgiven for assuming that the vast majority of licensed workers hold rela-
tively uncommon low-wage jobs.46  Prominent media outlets such as The 
New York Times and The Wall Street Journal have featured stories emphasizing 
the wide array of professions now subject to licensing requirements, includ-
ing horse masseurs, shampooers, egg handlers, and upholstery repairers.47  
The disproportionate attention paid to licensing requirements in these pro-
fessions is in part attributable to the steady increase in licensing of occupa-
tions that historically were not previously licensed.48  
Critics of licensure also tend to focus on these professions because they 
make the strongest rhetorical argument that licensing is not necessary to 
improve quality.  Proponents of the public choice account often tend to fo-
 
44. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 158 (1962) (“I am myself 
persuaded that licensure has reduced both the quantity and quality of medical practice.”). 
45. See WH REPORT, supra note 24, at 13.  
46. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 2, at 216–19 (listing a number of professions that do not 
appear to fit the rationale for licensing); Morris M. Kleiner, Why License a Florist, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/opinion/why-license-a-
florist.html. 
47. See Patricia Cohen, Moving to Arizona Soon? You Might Need a License, N.Y. TIMES (June 
17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/economy/job-licenses.html; 
Josh Zumbrun, Occupational Licenses May Be Bad for the Economy, But Good for Workers Who Have 
Them, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 18, 2016, 1:13 PM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/04/18/occupational-licenses-may-be-bad-for-the-
economy-but-good-for-workers-who-have-them/; see also Jacob Goldstein, Why It's Illegal To 
Braid Hair Without A License, NPR, PLANET MONEY BLOG (June 12, 2012, 9:06 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2012/06/21/154826233/why-its-illegal-to-braid-
hair-without-a-license (stating hair braiders are also required to be licensed). 
48. See generally Kleiner & Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing, supra 
note 6, at 678; Kleiner & Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on 
the Labor Market, supra note 6, at S175–76. 
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cus on licensing requirements for relatively small, lower-wage professions 
such as florists, since—to many people—it seems intuitively implausible 
that such professions pose enough of a threat to public safety to merit licen-
sure.49  For the same reason, the predominance of public choice theory has 
led to less emphasis being placed on traditionally licensed professions such 
as medicine, for which the justification for licensing is stronger.50 
This emphasis can obscure the fact that today, many licensed workers 
work in traditionally licensed fields such as health care, law, education, and 
business (Figure 1).51  Many of these professions are licensed by most or all 
states, and many of them earn higher incomes.  Even some of the most fer-
vent critics of licensing concede that the justification for licensing—though 
not necessarily the content of the licensing requirements or the current 
scope of practice—is stronger in fields like medicine, where unqualified 
practitioners can inflict substantial harm and where it is difficult for the 
public to evaluate a practitioner’s quality.52 
 
  
 
49. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 2, at 219. 
50. Arrow, supra note 21, at 967 (“It is the general social consensus, clearly, that the lais-
sez-faire solution for medicine is intolerable.”). 
51. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, CERTIFICATION AND 
LICENSING STATUS OF THE EMPLOYED BY OCCUPATION (2018).  Some examples of licensed 
professions in healthcare, law, education, and business include physicians, pharmacists, den-
tal hygienists, lawyers, teachers, personal financial advisors, tax preparers, real estate ap-
praisers, and accountants.  
52. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 44, at 138 (“I agree that the case for licensure is 
stronger for medicine than for most other fields.”); Shirley V. Svorny, Beyond Medical Licen-
sure, REGULATION, Spring 2015, at 26, 26 (“But when it comes to medical professionals, 
many of the staunchest critics of licensing back off.”).  
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Figure 1 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018 and authors’ calculations. 
 
This emphasis is arguably misplaced, however, since licensing regimes in 
traditionally licensed fields such as medicine and law have some of the most 
harmful consequences for workers and consumers.  Although licensing for 
most health care providers is widely viewed as necessary to ensure quality 
and to protect public safety, several features of this system restrict access to 
health care without resulting in appreciable quality improvements.53  For 
instance, so-called “scope-of-practice” restrictions prevent health care pro-
viders—such as nurse practitioners or dental hygienists—from offering ser-
vices to the full extent of their competency.54  State-specific licensing re-
 
53. See Gabriel Scheffler, Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming 
Occupational Licensing, 29 HEALTH MATRIX (forthcoming 2019) (outlining specific features of 
the licensing system for health care providers that limit access to health care without ensur-
ing quality, and proposing a federalist approach to reform). 
54. See, e.g., LEONARD J. FINOCCHIO ET AL., PEW HEALTH PROFS. COMM’N, 
REFORMING HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE REGULATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY (1995); INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, 
ADVANCING HEALTH (2011); E. Kathleen Adams & Sara Markowitz, Improving Efficiency in the 
Health-Care System: Removing Anticompetitive Barriers for Advanced Practice Registered Nurses and Physi-
cian Assistants, HAMILTON PROJECT (June 2018), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/removing_anticompetitive_barriers_for_advanced
_practice_registered_nurses_a. 
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quirements obstruct the adoption of telehealth by requiring health care 
providers to be separately licensed in each state that their patients are lo-
cated, or by requiring face-to-face consultations.55  In addition, licensing 
requirements deter foreign-trained providers from practicing in the United 
States by requiring them to complete costly and often duplicative training 
and testing.56 
Similarly, the licensure regime for legal practitioners has contributed to a 
system in which a staggering number of people are unable to afford legal 
representation, even when they are facing serious consequences, such as 
eviction, foreclosure, or imprisonment.57  For instance, in New York State 
in 2010, 98% of tenants in eviction cases and 95% of parents in child sup-
port cases appeared in court without an attorney.58  Gillian Hadfield and 
Deborah Rhode write that “one major contributing factor” to this lack of 
access is that the market for legal services is “among the most, if not the 
most, intrusively regulated in the modern economy.”59  Hadfield and 
Rhode observe, for example, that only those who have obtained a Juris 
Doctor (J.D.), passed the bar exam, and hold a valid license may provide 
paid legal assistance, and that “[l]egal services must be provided by a law 
firm that is owned, managed, and financed exclusively by lawyers.”60 While 
the current licensing regime may raise the quality of legal services for those 
who are able to obtain them, it likely causes others to go without legal ser-
vices altogether. 
C. The Potential for Improving—Not Abolishing—Licensing  
The public choice account—if taken at face value—implies that abolish-
 
55. See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffman & Virginia Rowthorn, Legal Impediments to the Diffusion of 
Telemedicine, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 8 (2011) (“State laws regarding physician li-
censure present the greatest challenge to the interstate practice of telemedicine.”). 
56. See, e.g., GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES & IMMIGRANTS TASK 
FORCE ON IMMIGRANT HEALTHCARE PROF’LS IN MASS., RX FOR STRENGTHENING 
MASSACHUSETTS’ ECONOMY AND HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (2014).  
57. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Way Courts Regulate 
Legal Markets, 143 DAEDALUS  83, 83–84 (2014).   
58. Id.; see also TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES IN NEW 
YORK, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1 (2010), 
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2018-04/CLS-
TaskForceREPORT.pdf. 
59. Gillian K. Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Services to Promote Ac-
cess, Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1194 (2015).  But see Frank 
Pasquale, The Real Barriers to Access to Justice, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/03/legal-eds-futures-no1.html (attrib-
uting lack of access to legal representation to other factors, such as the underfunding of pub-
lic defenders). 
60. Hadfield & Rhode, supra note 59, at 1194. 
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ing licensing altogether is the ideal way to reform licensing, even when evi-
dence supports less-radical reforms.  If licensing mainly exists to enhance 
practitioners’ market power, and if there is no legitimate public interest ra-
tionale, then why not just get rid of licensing altogether?61 
Yet many of the costs of licensing appear to depend not on licensing per 
se, but on how specific licensing requirements are structured.  For example, 
Janna Johnson and Morris Kleiner find that workers in occupations that 
have state-specific licensing exams are less likely to move across states than 
workers in other occupations, but workers in occupations with national li-
censing exams are no less likely to move than other workers.62  They also 
find that reciprocity agreements increase interstate mobility for lawyers.63 
Similarly, a report by the National Employment Law Project found over 
12,000 licensing restrictions that automatically disqualify individuals with 
any kind of felony, and more than 6,000 restrictions that disqualify individ-
uals with a misdemeanor, regardless of whether there is reason to think they 
would pose a real threat to public health or safety.64 
It is also important to consider the ways that licensing can limit innova-
tion, particularly when licensing rules specify the ways in which work tasks 
must be conducted.65  Often these limitations are not intended by policy-
makers who introduce and formulate initial licensing requirements.  Fur-
thermore, although the requirements may be in line with the prevailing 
work standards at the time, as time passes, changing technology or other 
advances (e.g., the possibility of telehealth) may render the original regula-
tion more confining.66  
 
61. See CARPENTER & MOSS, supra note 36, at 10 (“[A]rguments stipulating capture of-
ten . . . move quickly from ‘is’ to ‘ought,’ and they are especially likely to recommend dereg-
ulation.”). 
62.  JANNA E. JOHNSON & MORRIS M. KLEINER, IS OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING A 
BARRIER TO INTERSTATE MIGRATION 2 (2017). 
63. Id. 
64. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 
UNLICENSED & UNTAPPED: REMOVING BARRIERS TO STATE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSES FOR 
PEOPLE WITH RECORDS 1, 10 (2016).  However, it is important to note that these restrictions 
may benefit some workers who do not have criminal records.  See Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. 
Chung, Occupational Licensing Reduces Racial and Gender Wage Gaps: Evidence from the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation 2–3 (Human Capital Econ. Opportunity Global Working Grp., 
Working Paper No. 2017-50 2017).  
65. See, e.g., WH REPORT, supra note 24, at 45 (describing how the “the ‘corporate prac-
tice of law’ doctrine . . . has been applied to online legal document and information compa-
nies seeking to provide online legal assistance or other innovative products.”). 
66. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman, Physician Licensure and Telemedicine: Some Competitive Issues 
Raised by the Prospect of Practicing Globally While Regulating Locally, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL'Y 87, 89 (2011) (“[T]elemedicine promises in various ways to reduce the costs and ex-
tend the reach of many health care services, but the advantages of remote and networked 
expertise may be poorly accommodated by licensing schemes that were developed to regu-
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Many of the harms of licensing are therefore not intrinsic to licensing it-
self, and some harms can be alleviated without eliminating licensing alto-
gether.  Reforms aimed at such harms may be complementary to delicen-
sure efforts, as they address a different (and wider) range of occupations 
than it would be appropriate to delicense.  The Obama Administration’s 
2015 report provided a number of best practices toward that end, including 
promoting the appointment of public representatives to licensing boards, 
harmonizing licensing requirements to the maximum extent possible across 
states, and limiting entry requirements to those that specifically address le-
gitimate public health and safety concerns.67  Changes in how a profession 
is licensed—not just whether it is licensed—can result in tangible improve-
ments in the lives of workers and consumers.68 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the standard public choice narrative about occupational licens-
ing is simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive.  On one hand, it is 
overinclusive as it suggests that licensing laws are rarely justified, even in 
the face of plausible alternative explanatory accounts.  If policymakers and 
judges were to take this narrative at face value, they might strike down 
many licensing laws that benefit the public.  Of course, there is a strong 
case for subjecting licensing laws to greater scrutiny, and there are profes-
sions for which the costs of licensure clearly outweigh the benefits.  Yet in 
other cases—perhaps in many cases—the cost-benefit calculus will be less 
clear.  
At the same time, however, the standard public choice narrative is un-
derinclusive as it tends to focus less on dominant professional organizations, 
such as physicians and lawyers, and more on smaller, lower-wage profes-
sions.  This is unfortunate, since the former licensing regimes have particu-
larly detrimental consequences for workers and consumers.  In addition, 
the public choice narrative is underinclusive because it has little to say 
about professions for which there are credible public safety risks of unregu-
lated activity.  We argue that there is a strong basis for licensure reform in 
these professions that, while less radical than complete deregulation, would 
nonetheless enhance labor market access and benefit consumers. 
Judges in particular would do well to keep these critiques in mind.  We 
believe that public officials and government agencies are better equipped 
than courts to implement the kind of nuanced and multi-faceted reforms 
that are necessary, and thus that the current constitutional challenges to li-
 
late local medical practices — practices historically dominated by face-to-face encounters 
between a physician and her patient.”). 
67. WH REPORT, supra note 24, at 43. 
68. Id. at 43–55 (explaining the benefits of these best practices, such as improved labor 
market entry and interstate mobility). 
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censing regimes are unwise (to say nothing of their broader effects for regu-
lation more generally).  Of course, reforming licensing through the political 
process is difficult, but the federal government has taken several initial steps 
toward changing licensing requirements for health care providers, which 
provides reason for cautious optimism.69  Regardless, policymakers and 
judges would do well to draw on the public choice account of licensing 
without adopting it uncritically. 
 
 
69. See Scheffler, supra note 53. 
